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Reviewed by William S. Fields**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the Inspector General concept long has been a fixture of military establishments, its utilization for the systematic oversight of civilian
federal governmental agencies is a phenomenon of relatively recent origin. Indeed, the first significant step toward a uniform government-wide
application of this concept in a civilian context came only with the enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978.1 The Inspector General Act
created Offices of Inspector General in twelve major federal agencies.
The principal purpose of those offices, as set forth in the second section
of the Act, was "to conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the[ir] establishments." 2 The con* Professor of Public Affairs, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs,
University of Minnesota; Senior Fellow, Governance Institute; Special Adviser, U.S.
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee; and Senior Adviser, National Commission on
the Public Service. His previous works include: FORGING LEGISLATION (1992), THE
PRESIDENT'S AGENDA: DOMESTIC POLICY CHOICE FROM KENNEDY TO REAGAN (rev. ed.
1992), ARTFUL WORK: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM (1985), and VIcE
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: ADVICE AND INFLUENCE IN THE WHrE HOUSE (1984).
** Attorney, Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior. B.A., Univer-

sity of Virginia, 1976; J.D., College of William and Mary, 1979. Member of the bars of
Virginia and the District of Columbia. The opinions expressed herein are those of the
author and do not represent the views of the United States Government or any of its
agencies or officials.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. (1988 &

Supp. IV 1992)).

2. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1988).
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cept proved so successful that the original Act was repeatedly amended,'
extending the concept to virtually every federal agency, so that by 1989
the number of establishments with Offices of Inspector General totaled

sixty-one.4 As a result, in less than two decades, the Offices of Inspector
General became the leading organizations responsible for audit and investigative oversight of executive branch programs and operations.
In his recent work Monitoring Government,5 Professor Paul C. Light
examines the history, development, and future of the Inspector General
concept. Light analyzes the influence Inspectors General exert upon governmental management and the effectiveness of their approach in assuring governmental accountability. Prepared under the auspices of the
Brookings Institution and the Governance Institute, the book draws
heavily upon original research conducted at the behest of the Administrative Conference.6 It is an original, comprehensive, and scholarly look at

an arcane but important subject, and is the most significant and substantial work to date on the role of the Inspectors General in the American
political system.7
3. Pub. L. No. 101-73, tit. V, § 501(b)(1), tit. VII, § 702(c), 103 Stat. 393, 415 (1989)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 8E, 11 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); Pub. L. No. 100-527,
§§ 13(h)(2), (3), 102 Stat. 2643 (1988) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2, 11 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)); Pub. L. No. 100-504, tit. I, §§ 102(a)-(d), (f)-(h), 104(a), 105-107, 109113, 102 Stat. 2515-18, 2521-22, 2525-30 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5 U.S.C. app.); Pub. L. No. 99-399, tit. IV, § 412(a), 100 Stat. 867 (1986) (codified at 5
U.S.C. app. § 2 (1988)); Pub. L. No. 99-93, tit. I, § 150(a), 99 Stat. 427 (1985) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2, 11 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); Pub. L. No. 97-252, tit. XI,
§ 1117(a)-(c), 96 Stat. 750-53 (1982) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 5, 8, 11 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)); Pub. L. No. 97-113, tit. VII, § 705, 95 Stat. 1544 (1981) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2, 8A, 11 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); Pub. L. No. 96-88, tit. V,
§ 508(n), 93 Stat. 694 (1979) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 5, 9, 11 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992)).
4. FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INSPECTORS GENERAL: ESTABLISHING STATUTES AND STATISTICS (1990), summarized in tabular form in
PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 26 (1993).
5. LIGHT, supra note 4.

6. See Bruce K. MacLaury, Foreword to LIGHT, supra note 4, at vii-viii.
7. For other works dealing with the Inspectors General, see MARK H. MOORE &
MARGARET J. GATES, INSPECTORS-GENERAL: JUNKYARD DOGS OR MAN'S BEST FRIEND?
(1986); INSPECTORS GENERAL: A NEW DIRECTION IN EVALUATION (M. Hendricks, M.
Mangano & W. Moran eds., 1990); John J. Adair & Rex Simmons, From Voucher Auditing
to Junkyard Dogs: The Evolution of FederalInspectorsGeneral, 8 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN.
91 (1988); Herbert L. Fenster & Daryl J. Lee, The Expanding Audit and Investigative Powers of the Federal Government, 12 PUB. CONT. L.J. 193 (1982); Margaret J. Gates &
Marjorie F. Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REv. 473 (1985); Judy G. Kopff, The Inspectors General-On-the-Spot Watchdogs, 15 GAO REV. 56 (1980); Raymond C. McCann,
Procurement FraudInvestigative Techniques: The Need for CongressionalExpansion of the
Inspector General Subpoena Power to Include the Power to Compel Testimony, 16 PuB.
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In conducting research for his book, Light utilized a tripartite methodology: 1) structured written questionnaires mailed to present and former
Inspectors General; 2) semi-structured interviews; and 3) analysis of primary documents. His documentary sources included not only readily
available materials, such as Inspector General semiannual reports, organizational charts, and congressional hearings, records and reports, private
memos, personal diaries, meeting logs, uncorrected transcripts, and similar items not ordinarily available to the public.' In his discussion of the
views of President Carter and other key administration officials toward
the Inspector General Act, for instance, he draws heavily upon the previously unpublished personal notes of Stuart Eizenstat, Carter's domestic
policy adviser.9 Light's work contains extensive footnotes and lists inter°
view contacts in the appendix.'
Structurally, the book is organized into five parts, each containing several chapters. The first part contains an overview of the basic types of
accountability and a brief history of the origins of the Inspector General
concept. Parts two, three, and four then proceed in more or less chronological order, analyzing the legislative history of the Inspector General
Act, the subsequent developmental history of the Inspector General concept, and the organization and structure of the Inspector General system.
The final part of the book examines the effectiveness of the Inspector
General concept and speculates as to its future prospects. Based upon his
findings, Light makes recommendations for changes at various junctures
in the book, particularly in the final chapter."

II.

COMPLIANCE MONITORING AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Light's primary theme in Monitoring Government is that the Inspector
General concept places too much emphasis upon compliance monitoring
as an approach to governmental accountability. 2 He contends that performance accountability and capacity-based accountability are more effective approaches, although they have a lower visibility and require
greater up-front financial outlays for investments in administrative infraCoNT. L.J. 470 (1987); Kurt W. Muellenberg & Harvey J. Volzer, The Inspector General
Act of 1978, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1049 (1980); James R. Richards & William S. Fields, The Inspector GeneralAct: Are Its Investigative Provisions Adequate to Meet Current Needs?, 12
GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 227 (1990); Thomas W. Novotny, The IGs-A Random Walk,
THE BUREAUCRAT, Fall 1983, at 35; Tom Shoop, The IG Enigma, GOV'T ExEcutivE, Jan.
1992, at 38.
8. LioHT, supra note 4, at 4-5.
9. Id. at 62.
10. Id. at 236, 241.
11. Id. at 5-8.
12. See id. at 8.
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structure, such as rewards, incentives, staffing increases, training, and the
introduction of more efficient technologies.' 3 Light blames this situation
not on the Inspectors General themselves, but on the president and Congress. 1 4 "Compliance monitoring not only generates a much greater volume of findings of failure . . . and thus more opportunities for credit
claiming by the Congress and the administration," writes Light, "but also
produces recommendations for actions that are less expensive, more politically palatable, cleaner jurisdictionally, and faster to implement." 5
Light notes at the outset of his work that the Inspector General Act,
like all legislation, was the product of political compromise, and reflected
an amalgam of two distinct and often conflicting concepts of the role of
the Inspectors General: Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal's view of the
Inspector General as a "lone wolf investigator," who would "operate
within a narrow compliance mandate," and Congressman L.H. Fountain's
view of the Inspector General as "a more cooperative member of the
president's management team," with somewhat broader responsibilities.' 6
Although concerns about accountability, public confidence in governmental institutions, and "the politics of fraud busting" were motivating
factors,' 7 "Congress's growing thirst for information" served as the principal driving force behind the passage of the Inspector General Act.'" Its
enactment coincided with the arrival in Congress of "a new kind of member, one motivated primarily by ambition and publicity,"' 9 an increase in
congressional staff and oversight activity, and a proliferation of standing
committees and subcommittees.20 As Light's statistical analysis demonstrates, the pattern of deployment of the new congressional staff had a
profound influence on the way the Inspector General concept evolved. 2
The first Inspectors General, appointed during the latter half of the
Carter administration, encountered serious resistance within their respective agencies at a time when the administration was politically weak, and
their survival became dependent on the formation of alliances with the
Congress.22 These alliances in turn were dependent on the Inspectors
General's ability to produce the types of useful findings and statistics that
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See id. at 5-8.
See id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 58-77.
Id. at 39-50.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 51-53.
Id. at 53-57.
Id. at 81.
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were generated by compliance monitoring.' Congressional staff allocations favored the Senate and full committees of the House therefore,
House subcommittees became more dependent than other congressional
institutions upon outside information, and the Inspectors General, in essence, became creatures of the House subcommittees.2 4
The arrival of the Reagan administration produced a brief period of
instability for the Inspectors General, precipitated by the new administration's initial firing of the Carter-appointed Inspectors General. 25 This
was soon followed, however, by a reassertion of executive control over
the Inspector General community by the Office of Management and
Budget, utilizing the newly created vehicle of the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency.2 6 The Inspector General concept fit neatly into
the Reagan "anti-Washington" political motif, with Inspector General audits and investigations providing the new administration with statistical
and anecdotal evidence to support its allegations that the bureaucracy
was rampant with fraud, waste and abuse.27 It is, therefore, not surprising
that Light characterizes the Reagan years as the "glory days" of the Inspector General concept.2 During the Reagan administration the size of
Inspector General staffs increased substantially, 29 and the Inspectors
General became more independent of their home agencies. 30 They also
gained a say in the Inspector General selection process, 3 ' resulting in a
trend toward the appointment of candidates from within the career service of the Inspector General community.32
Although the Inspectors General's ties to Congress weakened somewhat during the Reagan years, the utilization of compliance monitoring
as the principal means of assuring governmental accountability became
even more pronounced-albeit now for the new masters at the Office of
Management and Budget. 33 A hallmark of the period was what Light
describes as "a drift towards investigations"-an increased emphasis
upon high visibility investigations led by Inspectors General who were
the product of an "investigator culture," which in turn placed a heavy
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
1I
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

81-82.
51-57.
102-03.
104.
116.
103.
110-11.
111-18.
107.
117-18.
57, 102-03.
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emphasis upon political acumen and external relations.34 Less obvious
but equally important was the fact that the ascent of the Inspectors General was paralleled by a decline in the importance of the assistant secretaries for administration and management, who lost their audit and
investigative capacity with the enactment of the Inspector General Act,
and thus "the capacity to learn about departmental problems first."'35 In
the early 1980s the assistant secretaries, once important career-reserved
positions, were in the process of being converted to political positions
and, in Light's words, "became little more than a holding pattern for
'36
political appointees looking for a better job."
One significant occurrence of the Reagan years that Light discusses
only briefly is the extension of the Inspector General concept to the remaining major departments and, in particular, to thirty-three smaller
agencies as part of the 1988 amendments to the Inspector General Act.3 7
As Light correctly notes, the smaller agency Inspectors General "share[ ]
the same name, but not the same resources or statutory authority '38 as
their departmental counterparts. They are appointed by their agency
heads, not by the president, and lack separate appropriations accounts
and minimum staffing requirements. 39 It is therefore likely that their developmental history will be considerably different from that of the Inspector General concept in the major departments. Light does not
elaborate on this point, perhaps because it is still too early to draw any
meaningful conclusions on the impact of the smaller agency Inspectors
General. It is, however, an important topic which warrants further
scrutiny.
The arrival of the Bush administration brought an end to the "golden
days" of the Inspector General concept and signaled the beginning of
what Light characterizes as a period of "backlash."4 Unlike its predecessor, the incoming administration did not fire the holdover Inspectors
General, but neither did it tell them that they would be kept on. 41 Instead, the Inspector General community hung in limbo, awaiting a clear
signal from the White House as to the new administration's direction.4 2
It did not have to wait long, however, as it became increasingly obvious
that the Inspectors General had been downgraded on the president's
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 149-74.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
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management agenda.4 3 The Inspectors General's influence at the Office
of Management and Budget declined, and the White House was slow to
fill vacant Inspector General posts." Furthermore, when appointments
were made, they went to relatively inexperienced political appointees instead of individuals from the Inspector General career service, a clear
break with the tradition of the Reagan years.45 Relations between the
Inspectors General and the Bush administration became decidedly hostile following the issuance of a March 9, 1989 legal opinion entitled "Authority of the Inspector General to Conduct Regulatory Investigations,"
by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel.46
The controversy over the Office of Legal Counsel opinion was a seminal event in the developmental history of the Inspector General concept.
The opinion in culminated a two-year dispute between the Labor Department's Inspector General and the Solicitor over the Inspector General's
authority to conduct criminal investigations of violations of departmental
regulatory statutes. 47
Although enforcement of the statutes in question was the responsibility
of other agency components, such as the Pension Welfare Benefits Administration, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and
the Employment Standards Administration, those components lacked
both the resources and expertise to pursue the cases. Moreover, the Labor Inspector General had by means of memoranda of understanding
sought to consolidate responsibility for their enforcement in his own office. He based this effort upon section 4 of the Inspector General Act,
which authorized him to "conduct, supervise, and coordinate... investi48
gations relating to the programs and operations of [his department],"
and section 6 of the Act, which authorized him "to make such investigations... relating to the administration of the programs and operations of
.. . [his] establishment as [were], in [his] judgment, . . . necessary or
desirable."4 9
The Office of Legal Counsel first sought to avoid entanglement in the
dispute, but eventually issued an opinion in which it concluded that the
Labor Inspector General lacked the authority to conduct such investiga43. Id.
44. Id. at 134-35.
45. Id.
46. Authority of Inspector General to Conduct Regulatory Investigations, 13 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 63 (1989) [hereinafter OLC Opinion].
47. LIcrGT, supra note.4, at 135-45.
48. 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(2) (1988).
49. Id. § 6(a)(2).
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tions.5 0 It based its decision on section 9 of the Inspector General Act,
which prohibited agency heads from transferring "program operating responsibilities" to the Inspector General,5 1 and a portion of the legislative
history of the Act, which stated:
While Inspectors General would have direct responsibility for
conducting audits and investigations relating to the efficiency
and economy of program operations and the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in such programs, they would not
have such responsibility for audits and investigations constituting an integral part of the programs involved. 2
The opinion ostensibly applied only to the Labor Department and, as
Light notes, had it stuck narrowly to the issue at hand, a dispute with the
Inspector General community at large might never have ensued.53
In the second part of the opinion, however, the Office of Legal Counsel, of its own volition, went on to state affirmatively that Inspectors General could only investigate the actions of their departments and its
employees, and the recipients of federal funds, such as contractors and
grantees. 54 This narrow reading of the statute struck at the jurisdictional
heart of a number of highly visible investigations being conducted by Inspector General offices other than Labor's, and in some cases forced the
suspension of investigative activity with respect to broad categories of
cases. 55 "Flawed or not," writes Light, "the OLC memo wreaked havoc
'
in the [Inspector General] community. 56
The Inspectors General's response to the situation was to complain
loudly that the opinion would bring their investigative operations to a
standstill and to seek a modification or reversal of the opinion from the
Office of Legal Counsel's new head, Assistant Attorney General William
Barr. 7 When that effort did not produce the desired results, they took
the matter to Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the Senate Government
Affairs Committee. Senator Glenn held hearings on the issue and introduced legislation to reverse the opinion's holding.5" Light sees Glenn's
legislation, however, as nothing more than a "bargaining chip" in the dispute, since it was opposed by the committee's ranking Republican mem50. LIGrr, supra note 4, at 136-38.

51. 5 U.S.C. app. 3, § 9(a)(2); see also OLC Opinion, supra note 46, at 73-74.
52. H.R. REP. No. 584, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1977); see also OLC Opinion,
supra note 46, at 70.
53. LioHrT, supra note 4, at 139.
54. OLC Opinion supra note 46, at 79-81.
55. Liowr, supra note 4, at 141-42.
56. Id. at 140.
57. Id. at 143.
58. Id. at 141.
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ber, Senator William Roth. 9 At the height of the controversy, President
Bush nominated Assistant Attorney General Barr for the position of
Deputy Attorney General, a nomination that Senator Glenn intended to
Acplace on hold until the Office of Legal Counsel issue was resolved.
6
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the
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compromise
a
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Light,
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cording
Although Light adequately characterizes the legal dimensions of the
Office of Legal Counsel dispute, his analysis of its political aspects and
their repercussions for the Inspector General concept is somewhat limited. As related by Light, the dispute takes on the appearance of an esoteric "tempest in a teapot,",61 too removed from its larger political
context. Unfortunately, Light's characterization leaves the reader wondering why the dispute ever occurred in the first place, especially given
the fact that it was precipitated by Inspectors General who were a product of Light's "investigator culture" 6 2 -Inspectors General who placed a
heavy emphasis upon political acumen and external relations.6 3 Lacking
is an analysis of why the normally cautious Inspectors General misjudged
the influence of Barr and his associates and overestimated their own
strength, and how they came to embark upon such a high risk, all-ornothing strategy that would so profoundly affect the Inspector General
system.
In this regard, Light's discourse would have benefitted from a more
extensive examination of the Inspectors General's relation to the Department of Justice. The Office of Legal Counsel opinion was not issued in a
vacuum, but came after the Inspectors General had, for over a decade,
successfully been conducting the types of investigations which it sought to
prohibit. Many of those investigations had been conducted at the request
of other Justice Department components, particularly the Criminal Division and the Offices of the United States Attorneys. In short, those line
components of the department had encouraged the Inspectors General to
expand their investigative work and had never questioned their statutory
authority. With the issuance of the opinion, however, the Inspectors
General thought that Justice was now sending them mixed signals.
The situation was further aggravated by the Office of Legal Counsel's
unwillingness to allow the Inspectors General to give the opinion itself a
liberal interpretation. The opinion's own language seemed to invite such
an approach, stating at one point that it did not "purport[ ] to provide a
complete description of the nature and scope of [the Inspectors Gen59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

142-43.
137-45.
135-45.
163.
156-60.
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eral's] authorities."' But Inspector General efforts to continue the questioned investigative activities by relying on alternative bases of authority
that had not been addressed in the opinion, such as theories of "concurrent jurisdiction" or the expansive grants of authority found in section 7
of the Inspector General Act,6 5 uniformly were rebuffed.
Light also does not fully appreciate the significance the opinion's
source had in framing the controversy. The Inspectors General were line
managers concerned with the practical issues that confront career law enforcement officials; they did not want their efficient, smooth working investigative arrangements upset by silly requirements imposed upon them
by a small group of political appointees who knew nothing about the realities of Inspector General work. As presidential appointees with an enabling statute that gave them "independence," the Inspectors General
considered themselves immune from such interference.6 6 In essence, the
dispute became a conflict of cultures. To the Inspectors General, the
"real lawyers" of the Justice Department were the prosecutors and trial
attorneys that handled their cases-not the young conservative lairds and
their Federalist Society retainers who pontificated from the ivory tower
of the Office of Legal Counsel.
Light sees the genesis of the Office of Legal Counsel's position in the
traditional Justice Department enmity toward the Inspector General concept and in their irritation at having the system extended to their own
department, points made by Senator Glenn at the Senate hearings on the
opinion.6' Although these certainly were factors, they were not the only
things in play. To be sure, the Republican administrations were firmly on
record as being against government waste, fraud and abuse, but they also
had made other vague promises, such as "getting government off the
backs of the people," which the conservative theoreticians at the Office of
Legal Counsel also had to consider. While it might be all right to let the
Inspectors General beat up upon hapless bureaucrats for the amusement
of the electorate, it was a different matter when they started harassing
private citizens-especially key Republican constituencies, like doctors
and businessmen.
Light also makes only a cryptic reference to the Bush administration's
desire to carve out an identity separate from that established by the Rea64. OLC Opinion, supra note 46, at 79.
65. 5 U.S.C. app. § 7(a) (1988).
66. Section 3(a) of the Inspector General Act states: "Neither the head of the establishment nor the officer next in rank below such head shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from
issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation." Id. § 3(a).
67. LIGHT, supra note 4, at 138.
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gan administration.6" Such a statement seems to understate the profound
philosophical differences between the two presidents that undoubtedly
influenced their views toward the Inspector General concept. Before becoming president, Bush served for years in a variety of elected and appointed positions, developing a respect for the work of the senior career
civil servants. He did not share Reagan's "anti-Washington" attitude and,
in all likelihood, viewed with disdain the Inspectors General's heavy
handed bashing of their agencies' management. Bush's management
style emphasized teamwork and cooperation, not confrontation, something almost anathema to the Inspector General concept.
Moreover, the way in which the Office of Legal Counsel dispute played
out was somewhat more intricate than Light's rendition suggests.
Although the Inspectors General were united in their opposition to the
Office of Legal Counsel opinion, they could not agree on an appropriate
response to the opinion. Some Inspectors General thought it best to let
"sleeping dogs lie," while others would settle for nothing less than complete withdrawal of the opinion. In the middle of these two positions
were Inspectors General who were amenable to various modifications
that would benefit only themselves. Barr was willing to issue some sort of
modification, but only if it resulted in a complete settlement of the issue
and brought an end to Inspector General sniping at the administration.
Such a compromise was not possible, however, with each Inspector General jealously guarding his own statutory "independence." Further, as
the matter dragged on, the Inspectors General's position deteriorated.
The Inspectors General had claimed originally that the opinion would
cripple their investigative operations. However, as Light correctly notes:
"Most investigative cases continued unabated, no investigators were laid
off."6 9 Thus, having cast themselves in the role of "Chicken Little," their
cause floundered when they failed to produce a "falling sky."7 As a result, Barr simply waited out the Inspectors General, offering no substantive modification of the opinion.
While Light notes the significance of Senator Roth's opposition to the
Glenn legislation,7 1 he misses a key factor that influenced the outcome of
the controversy. During the pendency of the dispute, Senator Glenn was
fighting for his own political survival, having been implicated in the savings and loan scandal as one of the "Keating Five." As Deputy Attorney
General, Barr would serve as the administration's point man in the effort
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 143.
Id.
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to clean up the savings and loan mess. Therefore, Glenn could not delay
Barr's confirmation for too long, for obvious political reasons. Having
concluded his hearings, Glenn had milked the Office of Legal Counsel
issue for all of its political value. After placing Barr's nomination on
hold, he discretely withdrew his support for the Inspectors General.
Deprived of their powerful political sponsor, the Inspectors General
were forced to accept a settlement on Barr's terms-one that left the
opinion completely intact. In exchange for going quietly, Barr graciously
allowed the Inspectors General to claim victory and save face. For the
Inspectors General who were involved, however, it was not a compromise, as Light suggests, but a bitter defeat, and a humiliating lesson in
"civics" taught by two masters of the political craft-the veteran Senate
committee chairman and the brilliant young mandarin of the Bush Justice
Department. Even today, the full implications of the controversy have
yet to be realized. Just this past year, for instance, in the case of Burlington Northern Railroad v. Office of Inspector General,RailroadRetirement
Board,7 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit utilized
the rationale of the Office of Legal Counsel opinion to limit, for the first
time, the scope of Inspector General audit authority.7 3
For the Bush administration, the conclusion of the Office of Legal
Counsel controversy had a more immediate impact, which Light alludes
to in passing, but does not develop.7 4 With their investigative authority
curtailed, the Inspectors General began turning their attention to the area
of program audits. These audits have proven to be almost as fruitful a
source of headlines as the high visibility investigations had been. Unfortunately for President Bush, they provided the President's Democratic
opponents with a valuable source of ammunition with which to harass his
weakened administration. Moreover, on a more philosophical level, the
shift in emphasis toward audits, in a sense, also marked the end of what5
Light characterized in chapter eight as the "drift toward investigation."
III. THE LiMrrs OF EFFEcrIVE OVERSIGrr
In the final part of his book, Light evaluates the overall impact of the
Inspector General concept as it relates to the issue of governmental accountability and concludes, in essence, that the Inspectors General have
been more or less effective at what they do, but what they do has not
72.
73.
74.
pletion
75.

983 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 641.
Unfortunately, Light's book went to press before the 1992 election and the comof the Bush administration.
LIorr, supra note 4, at 149.
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been effective.7 6 That is, they do a relatively good job of compliance
monitoring, but compliance monitoring alone has not been that effective
at increasing governmental accountability. Audits and investigations focus too much on small problems at the expense of larger systemic issues.
"It is simply not enough to catch bad guys," writes Light, "[tihe long-run
success of the [Inspector General] concept can be measured only by the
quality of life produced by government."'7 7
Based upon his findings, Light recommends a number of solutions to
the problems he perceives exist with Inspectors General. His recommendations are often quite specific in nature, but there are two basic premises
underlying them: first, more emphasis should be placed upon performance accountability and capacity building accountability; second, the Inspectors General can and should provide the leadership necessary to take
that direction, particularly in the area of performance accountability.78
Both of these premises are highly debatable.
With respect to the first premise, Light exhibits a distinct preference
for the more contemporary private sector methods of accountability and
would encourage their application to the government in modified form.
At the outset of his book, he cites with approval Michael Barzelay and
Babak Armajani's post-bureaucratic paradigm that reflects "'the notion
that government organizations should be customer-driven and serviceoriented,"' 7 9 and Mary Walton's explanation of W. Edward Deming's
management philosophy that "'[q]uality comes not from inspection but
from improvement of the process."" These rubrics may have a warm
and fuzzy feel about them, but it is not clear that such approaches would
be viable in a government context.
In the private sector, where "money talks," the customer is the one
who pays for the good or service, and the quality of the good or service
he receives is related directly to the amount he is willing to pay. Thus, the
customer's primary concern is the quality of what he receives. With respect to government goods and services, the situation is somewhat different. The person paying for the good or service is often not the one who
receives it, and the person receiving the good or service is not only concerned about the quality of what he receives, but also the quality of what
his neighbor is receiving. Variances in quality can result in allegations of
"discrimination" or "favoritism." Thus, in the public sector, there is a
76. Id. at 224.
77. Id. at 220.
78. Id. at 203-35.

79. Id. at 21

(quoting MICHAEL BARZELAY
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political incentive to provide goods and services that are uniform and of
the lowest acceptable quality. That incentive, in turn, helps to promote
the public demand for compliance monitoring.
Further, the private sector concept of "value" and thus "quality" is
much more definite than its governmental counterpart. In the private
sector, goods and services are, for the most part, fungible and their value
is determined in a strictly economic sense. With respect to government
goods and services, there is a considerable variance in their perceived
value, which is not determined in strictly economic terms, but is dependent in large measure upon the political persuasion of the individual making the assessment and the extent to which personal benefits exceed
personal costs.
The above differences suggest some of the difficulties that would arise
when an attempt is made to adapt private sector methods of performance
accountability to the public sector, and why compliance monitoring continues to be the principal means of governmental oversight. The private
sector/public sector dichotomy also serves to underscore the reasons why
it would be difficult for the Inspectors General to play a role in any
movement away from accountability based upon compliance monitoring.
Light's premise that the Inspectors General should play a leadership
role in shifting the government's orientation more towards performance
accountability is based upon what are, for him, practical considerations.
The first is his conclusion that the language of the Inspector General Act
is already broad enough to accommodate such a role.8 ' The second consideration is his conclusion that the Inspectors General are presidential
appointees with sufficient "independence" to insulate them from the
political fall-out that would come from instituting such reforms.8 2 The
third is that the Inspectors General already have a lock on the resources
that the government devotes to accountability. 3 There are, however,
countervailing aspects to each of these considerations.
Light is correct in his conclusion that the language of the Inspector
General Act is broad enough to allow the Inspectors General to exercise
leadership in the areas of performance accountability and capacity building accountability should they choose to do so.' But there is no way to
get around the fact that the principal job assigned to the Inspectors General by the Act is "to conduct and supervise audits and investigations
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 195-96, 225-26.
See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 4(a)(2)-(5) (1988).
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relating to the programs and operations of the[ir] establishments."'8 5 As
Light concedes, the emphasis on auditing and investigating is reinforced
repeatedly in both the legislative history of the Inspector General Act
and the developmental history of its implementation. It is, therefore, unlikely that Inspectors General would, of their own volition, depart from
that clear statutory mandate.
Further, Light does not fully appreciate the extent to which the Inspectors General's compliance monitoring agenda now is driven by statutes
other than the Inspector General Act. The past ten years have seen the
enactment of a host of congressional directives requiring Inspectors General to oversee specific programs. Some of these laws, such as the Single
Audit Act,86 the Chief Financial Officers Act,87 and the Program Fraud
Civil Remedies Act," are applicable to Inspectors General governmentwide, while others are agency specific, such as annual appropriations acts
that require an agency Inspector General to conduct a yearly audit of a
particular program. 9 Taken together, these congressional mandates have
reduced substantially the amount of time and resources that the Inspectors General can devote to their discretionary activities.
While it is true that the Inspectors General of the major departments
are presidential appointees vested with a degree of "independence," it is
not at all clear that they would have the political strength or acumen to
bring about such fundamental changes to the current approach toward
accountability. Inspectors General ordinarily rise through the career service and lack the independent political bases and personal wealth that are
characteristic of most major political appointees. As a general rule, they
are not known by, nor do they have strong ties to, the presidents under
whom they serve. Their job is one of staff support, not program opera85. Id. at §§ 2, 3, 4(a)(1), 6(a)(2), 7(a).
86. Pub. L. No. 98-502, § 2(a), 98 Stat. 2327 (1984) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7507
(1988)).
87. Pub. L. No. 101-576, tit. I, § 101, 104 Stat. 2838 (1990) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 501
(1988)).
88. Pub. L. No. 99-509, tit. VI, subtit. B, § 6103(a), 100 Stat. 1933 (1986) (codified at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3801-3812 (1988)).
89. For instance, the annual appropriations acts for fiscal years 1987 through 1989 for
the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Utah Project required the Department of the Interior's Inspector General to conduct an annual audit of the project's administrative expenses for each of the specified years. See Pub. L. No. 100-371, tit. II, § 205, 102 Stat. 866
(1988); Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-118 (1987); Pub. L. No. 99-591, tit. II, § 205, 100
Stat. 3341-204 (1986). Additionally, pursuant to the Insular Areas of the United States
Act, Pub. L. No. 97-357, 96 Stat. 1705 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
48 U.S.C.), the Department of the Interior Inspector General is required to perform the
programmatic audit duties of the former United States Comptroller for the territories of
Guam, 48 U.S.C. § 1422(d) (1988), American Samoa, id. § 1668, the Virgin Islands, id.
§ 1599, and the Thst Territory of the Pacific Islands, id. § 1681(b).
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tion or policy making. Further, because of the kind of work they do, Inspectors General are disliked and distrusted by the managers of their
agencies, a circumstance which would make it difficult for them to form
the cooperative and collegial working relationships necessary to effectively implement proactive changes. Although at times they have worked
congenially with the White House or the Office of Management and
Budget, the Inspectors General really have never been "a strong right
arm" of their own agencies' management.
Finally, Light is correct in noting that Inspectors General have, at least
for the moment, a lock on the available accountability resources. 90 However, the nature of those resources would again make it difficult for Inspectors General to focus effectively on methods of accountability other
than compliance monitoring. The Offices of Inspector General were created by the combination of existing groupings of auditors and investigators. The vast majority of their staff, even today, are compliance
monitoring professionals. As a result, the offices have an institutional
compliance monitoring mind-set and orientation that would be difficult to
overcome. They also lack the expertise necessary to design and implement the kinds of accountability systems that Light advocates.
In short, it is up to Congress and the president, not the Inspectors General, to provide leadership in any movement toward a system of performance accountability or capacity building accountability. It was Congress'
decision to create the compliance monitoring oriented Inspector General
system; it is Congress' and the president's demand for information that
drives it. Further, Congress has shown no interest in making the financial
investments necessary to implement viable performance accountability or
capacity-based accountability systems. Faced with these political realities,
the Inspectors General are not in a position to take a different course. If
they depart from their clear mandate and venture into other areas, they
do so at considerable risk. As the Office of Legal Counsel controversy so
aptly demonstrated, the Inspectors General are only character actors in
the Washington drama, not its stars.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Having presented his case for reform, the specific changes that Light
suggests seem at times almost too mild and, indeed, it is often difficult to
understand how they would effectuate his larger purposes. For example,
after lamenting about the drift toward investigations and questioning the
effectiveness of the Inspectors' General compliance monitoring emphasis,
90. LIGHT, supra note 4, at 195-96, 225-26.
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Light advocates amending the Inspector General Act to give the Inspectors General fixed terms. 91 A fixed term was, of course, a hallmark of the
Rosenthal "lone wolf investigator" Inspector General model, the quintessential compliance monitor. 2 Similarly, Light recommends that Inspectors General utilize more of their resources to conduct performance
evaluations of the type done by the Department of Health and Human
Services Office of Inspector General. 93 He sees these evaluations as being much more useful to management than traditional compliance monitoring.9 4 Yet, such studies may in fact be misleading. Unlike audits, they
are not based upon a universally accepted methodology and thus, repeatedly have been criticized for being unscientific compilations of anecdotal
incidents compiled for political purposes.
Perhaps because his academic fields are political science and public administration, Light may place too much emphasis upon specific recommendations which he sees as having a realistic chance of being adoptedparticularly ones that do not require a significant reconfiguration of the
current Inspector General system. Although such an approach is taken at
the expense of his larger objectives, it does not detract from the overall
thoroughness of his study and the usefulness of his work. Light's conclusions and recommendations invite further discussion, not necessarily
agreement.
On the whole, Monitoring Government is a well-researched and
thoughtful book. It gives a detailed history of the origins and development of the Inspector General concept at a technical level, but at the
same time analyzes the implications of the concept for government management as a whole. It explores some of the crucial issues in accounting
theory and public administration, and the difficult trade-offs which they
entail. Perhaps most importantly, it is a scholarly work that airs opposing
points of view and, when opinions are expressed or positions taken, provides readers with sufficient information to make their own judgments.

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 169-71.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 194-99, 230-31.
Id.
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Harriman's glamorous years as a student at Groton 3 and Yale,4 and his
early careers as a championship polo player' and builder of ships during
World War I.6 Abramson also gives detailed attention to such matters as
Harriman's famous diplomatic career as Franklin Roosevelt's World War
II liaison with Winston Churchill,7 his role as emissary to Stalin's Russia,'
and his career as a foreign affairs advisor to Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson.' However, this review, for reasons that will become apparent,
focuses largely on Abramson's account of Harriman's years in Albany. i°
Abramson's clear and balanced presentation highlights an important
aspect of Harriman's single term as New York's Democratic governor
from 1954 to 1958: Harriman's term came between the long Republican
reigns of Thomas E. Dewey (1942 to 1954) and Nelson Rockefeller (1958
to 1974). 11 Competition with the powerful Republican governors preceding and following Harriman has diminished his reputation as governor, as
both Dewey and Rockefeller had much more time to influence the affairs
of the State of New York. Both also possessed more power and typically
had friendly legislatures dominated by their own party. 2 Harriman, on
the other hand, had to contend with Republican majorities in both
houses. 1 3 As a result, during Harriman's term a hostile Republican legislature usurped most law-initiating functions and confined the governor
14
largely to vetoing the legislature's initiatives.
In addition to these political frustrations, Harriman faced another
problem-while Dewey left office boasting that there was a budget surplus of $142 million, 5 this claim was misleading. As Abramson
comments:
3. ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 71-90.

4. Id. at 91-111.
5. Id. at 164-85.
6. Id. at 112-38.
7. Id. at 277-97.
8. Id. at 377-405. For the pros and cons of a recent controversy over whether Harrman was overly compliant in acceding to Stalin's plans for postwar domination of Poland,
see Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Averell Harriman's Cold War Hard-Lines,WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
1993, at A20 (letter to the editor), responding to Stephen S. Rosenfeld, An Earlier ilt
Toward Moscow, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1993, at A31, in turn reporting on William Larsh,
Averell Harrimanand the Polish Question, December 1943 to August 1944, 7 EAST EUROPEAN POL. & Soc'ys 573 (1993).
9. ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 570-674.
10. Id. at 516-69.
11. Id. at 516-17, 568.
12. Id. at 516-17.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 519.
15. Id. at 518.
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The trouble was that the surplus was in a special fund created
long ago to balance the budget in emergencies. Dewey had
deftly avoided either tapping the emergency fund or increasing
taxes by dipping heavily into yet another kitty-a special account that had been set up to pay for postwar construction
projects. It was a sleight of hand made possible because the
state had adopted budget habits resembling a housewife's stashing spare cash in mattresses and sugar bowls.' 6
Consequently, from a practical standpoint, the state was deeply in debt.
Harriman was thus in a position not unlike that of President Clinton on
his recent inauguration as President; he had many ideas for important
new programs, but no funds with which to implement them. It is small
wonder then that Harriman's visible successes were limited and that his
reputation as governor has never matched his fame as a presidential advisor and international negotiator.
Abramson's chapters on the Albany years of "The Guv," as Harriman
liked to refer to himself, 7 are both accurate and perceptive. On one
point, however, there may be some disagreement: Did Harriman like being governor? Abramson says:
He hadn't been so satisfied with life since he was in the prime
of his polo career. He had "tasted the pure unalloyed joy of self
discovery," said his friend Teddy White, and he had become "a
warmer, more gregarious person." He was an incessant booster
of his state, serving New York wine at dinner, touting Long Island ducks and potatoes,
and glorifying New York maple syrup
8
and Genesee beer.'
But some of those who worked for Harriman in Albany felt that state
matters bored him, particularly when he contrasted them with the larger
arenas where he had become accustomed to performing. Clearly he was
a much more effective performer in the area of international relations,
where he served four democratic presidents so well. As to his being a
16. Id
17. Id. at 520.
18. Id. at 521 (quoting Theodore H. White, The Democrats, COLLIERS MAGAZINE,
Oct. 28, 1955, at 25, 27) (footnote omitted). In one instance not reported in Abramson's
book, however, Harriman's New York State chauvinism ran him up against an equally
tough old Tarter. Dean Acheson, whom Harriman had coached on the Yale freshman
crew, id at 102, came to dinner at the governor's mansion. On being served New York
state wine with the meal, Acheson was heard to consign the entire Empire State to nether
regions for its presumption in thus attempting to appeal to his (relatively) refined taste.
Personal recollection of Thomas O'Connell. On this score, his son recently remarked:
"His taste in red and white table wine was discriminating, but far from sophisticated. His
wine dealer, he said, had forgotten more than Dad would ever know-why not rely on
him?" DAVID C. ACHESON, ACHESON CouNrTY: A MEMOIR § 153 (1993).
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"'warmer, more gregarious person"" 9 as governor, his aides saw little of
that side of his personality. Indeed, he was famous in Albany as an
overly demanding and ungracious boss. One cold winter's evening, for
example, his budget director, Clark Ahlberg, and several other budget
aides had stayed very late at his behest (they all worked very long hours,
though not as long as Harriman did). They were getting some figures
together for Harriman who was to leave shortly on a vacation in the tropics. Ahlberg took the numbers in to the Governor. The others waited
anxiously; if Harriman was not pleased with their work, he would insist
that they do it all over again, regardless of the hour. When Ahlberg came
out he was ashen. "What happened?" someone asked, "Did we screw
up?" "Oh, no," he replied, "the numbers were fine. After he checked
them and was putting them in his briefcase without a word, I ventured to
say, 'Have a nice trip, Governor.' He snapped at me, 'I have no time for
pleasantries!', 20
Because of his constant wars with the Republican legislature, Harriman
used his budget to build support outside the legislative halls for his few
basic programs. Abramson writes:
[H]e spent weeks explaining his management of [the budget] to
businessmen, newspaper publishers, labor union officers, and local government officials who were invited to the mansion to be
briefed. Before each session of the assembly, he held "budget
school" and more or less compelled Albany correspondents of
New York newspapers to wade line by line through the document, with [his first Budget Director, Paul] Appleby and himself
as their guides.
House rules for the evening sessions at the governor's mansion required reporters to address questions to the chief executive, who rephrased them to suit himself and put them to
Appleby."
Thomas O'Connell recalls one of the "budget school sessions" with
chagrin:
As Deputy Budget Director, I was there with the Budget Director, the Governor, and several other aides facing a battery of
media people. One reporter asked for a very specific figure in
the huge budget document. The Governor usually knew the
facts, but he didn't know that number. He bristled; he didn't
like not knowing. I could see what was coming, because I did
know the number. Harriman was notoriously hard of hearing
19. ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 521 (quoting White, supra note 18, at 27).
20. Personal recollection of Thomas O'Connell.
21. ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 520.
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(John Kennedy subsequently made it a condition of Harriman's
coming into the Kennedy administration that Harriman get a
hearing aid).
Knowing this limitation on the Governor's part, I spoke up as
loudly as I could without yelling, "Governor, the figure is
$1,500,000." He turned on me as though I had called him a foul
name and snarled loudly, "What?" Completely deflated, I repeated the number for the reporter. That was my one contribution to that budget school.
Although nearly everyone who worked for Harriman went through
those ignominious episodes, they all admired him nonetheless. They
knew he was absolutely devoted to the public service and that his integrity was unshakable. Besides, he had more energy and staying power
than any of his aides, most of them half his age.
In researching Harriman's files for his book, Abramson retraced some
of the steps taken in 1958 during Harriman's gubernatorial reelection bid
against Nelson Rockefeller, searching widely for information about his
subject. 22
Thomas O'Connell reminisces:
My own most interesting assignment as his aide was to write
his official campaign brochure. It was called "Greatness in a
Governor." I went to his Wall Street investment house, Brown
Brothers, Harriman, where many of the Harriman family files
were. I spent days there culling the incredibly rich mine of material, including choosing the best from thousands of pictures of
him. I was proud of what I finally came up with (helped by
other aides), but as I expected Harriman never mentioned it to
me. On the other hand, if "the Guv" paid little or no heed to
my efforts, that wasn't true of everyone. In doing the cover of
"Greatness in a Governor," in order to use a striking semi-profile photo of Harriman looking in the same direction as other
splendid pictures I found of former New York State democratic
governors Al Smith, Franklin Roosevelt and Herbert Lehman, I
reversed the Harriman photo. Only one colleague noticed, but
he roared at me, "That's not a true picture of Averell Harriman!" In any case, neither the brochure nor anything else could
have helped Harriman get reelected, in that Rockefeller was an
incomparably more fiery and attractive candidate, going on to
win four gubernatorial elections.
In his research for Spanning the Century, Abramson found rich mines
of information about Averell Harriman and the entire Harriman family,
22. Id. at 8 (describing the author's research of Harriman's files, documents, and
memorabilia in preparation for writing the biography).
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including old "E.H.," Averell's railroad-pioneer and "robber-baron" father; his mother Mary, referred to in newspapers as "[tihe world's richest
woman" after E.H.'s death' (which occurred just before Averell started
at Yale); 24 and Averell's siblings, who were also successful, though less so
than their famous brother.
In a sense, Abramson was fortunate that he approached Averell about
writing his biography very late in Averell's life.' He met less resistance
than previous chroniclers. For example, after the 1958 loss to Rockefeller, those familiar with the Albany years watched with interest as Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, who served as Assistant Secretary and Acting Secretary to the Governor, toiled to produce a history of "The Guv's" administration that the hyper-critical Harriman would accept. As they expected,
Moynihan proved too careful and honest a scholar to produce the requisite hagiography, and his manuscript was never published. 26 A second
effort on that front by Moynihan's fellow Syracuse University scholar,
Professor Frank Munger, also failed to pass muster; Harriman found it
27
"had missed the drama and vitality."
Though not discussed by Abramson, Harriman's leaving the Governorship was a disappointment not only to him, but to many of his aides as
well-and not simply because of the stinging electoral defeat. They had
to find new jobs on extremely short notice. On the very election day
when Harriman was defeated in the biggest state on the East Coast, another Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Edmund "Pat" Brown, was
elected in the biggest state on the West Coast-defeating U.S. Senate
Majority Leader William Knowland in the California election.28 In turn,
Brown let it be known that he was anxious to have some of the soon-tobe-out-of-work Harriman aides for his ambitious new administration.
But so uncooperative was Harriman in aiding in this transfer that California job opportunities for his aides withered. His aides-few of whom
were cushioned from financial worries as was Harriman-did not forget.
Reflecting this attitude, but not mentioned in Abramson's book, is an
incident in the early 1960s when Harriman was being mentioned as a New
York Senatorial candidate. At a Washington cocktail party, a gushing reporter approached Moynihan, who, like Harriman, was in the Kennedy
23. Id. at 105.
24. Id. at 91.
25. Id. at 8 ("[Spanning the Century] was undertaken after Harriman was in his nineties ....").
26. Id. (stating that Moynihan's work was "deemed too negative").
27. Id.
28. See ROGER RAPOPORT, CALIFORNIA DREAMING: THE POLITICAL ODYSSEY OF
PAT & JERRY BROWN iii, 54 (1982).
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administration. "Why, Pat," she said, "What are you doing here? I
thought all you Harriman folks would be in New York helping to organize his Senate bid." "Well no, not all," replied Moynihan. "Some of us
29
starved, you know."
Mention of Moynihan calls to mind that one of the most important
legacies of the Harriman years turned out to be the emergence of Moynihan in public service for New York State and the nation. In some ways,
though, Moynihan's early years as a Harriman aide did not portend his
later eminence. As Moynihan's biographer Douglas Schoen describes,
some of Moynihan's colleagues in the Harriman administration dismissed
him as a rather erratic, superficial, and self-important young man, more
renowned for his conviviality, wit, and volubility than for his drive and
reliability.3 0 More impressive to many was Moynihan's future wife, the
young, tireless, and able Elizabeth Brennan, secretary to Moynihan's
boss, Jonathan Bingham. Bingham, later a congressman from New York,
was then Harriman's executive secretary, with Moynihan serving as his
assistant. At the time, some of Liz Brennan's friends had a "lingering
sense that she was too good for [Moynihan]" and "cautioned her about
rushing into a marriage with him."'" But, undaunted, marry him she did.
Indeed it was during those Albany years that Moynihan began showing
what writer Timothy Crouse has described as his
rare and valuable .... gift of short-term prophecy. When he has
had a few drinks, he sometimes brags ... that he has a terrific
ability to identify a going issue. This may be one of his few understatements. He has spotted many a hot issue-from auto
safety to welfare reform-while it was still on the horizon of
public consciousness. He has an uncanny sense of precisely
what is going to worry people next.3 2
As Crouse indicates, it was as a Harriman aide that Moynihan began to
focus on the hitherto mundane topic of traffic safety. Moynihan brilliantly highlighted the fatuous emphasis of the traffic safety establishment
in New York and elsewhere on driver behavior when a much more exciting and profitable view would focus on the epidemiology of the problem-on traffic safety as a public health problem. 3 3 As the Harriman
official charged with administering the Governor's Traffic Safety Policy
29. Personal recollection of Thomas O'Connell.
30. DOUGLAS SCHOEN, PAT: A BIOGRAPHY OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN 53
(1979).
31. Id. at 54.
32. 'Tmothy Crouse, Ruling Classing Hero: How Pat Moynihan Became a Credit to his
Race, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 12, 1976, at 42-43.
33. Id.
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Coordinating Committee, Moynihan-working with Dr. William Haddon, Jr., then director of the Driver Research Center of the New York
State Department of Health-pursued the issue of whether New York
State's "points system" (under which a driver lost his license after amassing a specified number of points awarded for traffic violations) had any
appreciable effect on lowering the accident rate. Finding none, Moynihan began to exploit the establishment's lack of a productive approach to
the whole traffic safety problem, despite the vigorous protests of those
charged with traffic safety in Albany. In a follow-up article in the Reporter magazine, Moynihan, according to his biographer,
argued that accidents resulted from the concentration of a large
number of vehicles in a small area rather than from a nation of
careless drivers. The article pointed out that lowering the speed
limit in Connecticut had not significantly reduced the number of
accidents or the number of injuries caused by accidents. (And
even if it could be shown that human factors were responsible
for many accidents, what could the government do to influence
the personal traits of individual drivers?) However, the article
said, research showed that injuries received in accidents were
caused in large part by faulty automobile design, the improvement of which could eliminate seventy-five percent of the nation's auto fatalities each year. There was evidence that
automobile design had a direct impact on the [injury] ... rate,
that certain model cars were more prone to causing [injury]...
than others. The article concluded that since the auto industry
has traditionally been resistant to the introduction of such safety
features as padded dashboards and seat belts (on the assumption that they would be costly and hurt sales), it was important
the auto industry and
that an independent federal body regulate
34
develop safety standards for cars.
Thus it was that the Harriman administration antedated the efforts of
Ralph Nader and others in sparking the development of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the congressionally created
agency for dealing with automobile safety standards.3 5
34. SCHOEN, supra note 30, at 61 (citing Daniel P. Moynihan, Epidemic on the Highways, THE REPORTER, Apr. 30, 1959, at 16); see also DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, COPING: ON
THE PRACTICE OF GOVERNMENT 79 (1973); RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED
(1965); JEFFREY O'CONNELL & ARTHUR MYERS, SAFETY LAST: AN INDICTMENT OF THE
AUTO INDUSTRY (1966); Jeffrey O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U. L. REv.
299 (1963).
35. For Moynihan's current favorable view of those efforts to mandate car safety, see
D.P. Moynihan, Letter to New York: "Energy in the Executive," Oct. 22, 1992; for a different perspective on the early successes but subsequent frustrations of such efforts, see
JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
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As to Harriman's complaint, mentioned earlier, about a chronicle missing "the drama and vitality," of his administration,36 there was certainly
no lack of drama and vitality in Averell Harriman's life, whether in Albany, Moscow, London, or Washington, D.C. While this review has concentrated on the Albany years, there are countless other venues for
drama in this readable biography. We only cite several:
In 1964, travelling from London to Washington, D.C., Harriman, then a
Democratic State Department official, and Dwight Eisenhower, then the
Republican ex-President, were returning from serving in the official delegation at the funeral of their mutual old friend, Winston Churchill. Abramson tells the story in a kind of flashback that he uses uncommonly
well throughout this necessarily long and complex biography to help his
reader keep the narrative straight:
The flight had.., provided Harriman a compelling opportunity to end his feud with General Eisenhower. The former President had headed the American delegation to the funeral; and
... he had come back and said hello. After a few minutes, Averell had gone forward for a long private conversation with him in
the President's compartment.
It was the first time they had spoken to each other in more
than a decade. When Harriman had gone through a White
House receiving line at a reception for the nation's governors
soon after his election in 1954, Eisenhower, remembering Averell's venomous attacks on him in the 1952 [Presidential] campaign, had shown him no sign of recognition, coldly addressing
him as "Governor" and extending the perfunctory "welcome to
the White House." They had not met since. Each had taken
derogatory potshots at the other over the years, and in private
Eisenhower had referred to Averell as a "nincompoop" and a
"Park Avenue Truman." In return, Averell ridiculed him for
fawning over rich men. The nostalgic atmosphere on the plane
made the whole affair seem childish.37
Moynihan's interest in automobile issues later led him to a similarly prescient interest in
no-fault auto insurance. Daniel P. Moynihan, Next: A New Auto Insurance Policy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 26; see also Daniel P. Moynihan, Changes for
Automobile Claims?, in CRIsIs INCAR INSURANCE 1 (Robert E. Keeton et al. eds., 1968),
Daniel P. Moynihan, Foreword to JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY: AND THE
REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE vii (1971); Daniel P. Moynihan, Foreword to JEFFREY
O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES ix (1975).

36. ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 8.
37. Id. at 682 (quoting THE DIARY OF JAMES C. HAGERTY: EISENHOWER
COURSE, 1954-1955 240 (Robert H. Ferrell ed., 1983)) (footnote omitted).

IN MID

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 43:523

In early 1941, while he was serving in London as FDR's emissary to
Winston Churchill, Averell carried on a reckless love affair with Randolph Churchill's young wife, Pamela. Think of it: he is on a diplomatic
wartime mission of the highest importance, the chance of a lifetime for
this ferociously ambitious public servant, yet he quite openly carries on
an affair with the wife of his host's son who was absent on military duty.
This wild indiscretion reveals a fascinating anomaly in Harriman, caught
by Abramson's biography-a boring, mechanical, even stiff cardboard
figure on the surface masking a passionate, headstrong, risk-taking nether
side. Just thirty years after the affair with Pamela and shortly after the
death of Marie, Averell's second wife, Harriman met Pamela again in
Washington, D.C. At that point Averell was eighty, heartbroken by
Marie's death, and appearing and acting like a very old man. But he and
the fifty-year-old Pamela recommenced their affair and soon became engaged. Abramson writes:
Before the engagement was announced, [Pamela] had sent her
son [Winston] to deliver personally the news of her plans to
eighty-six-year-old Lady Churchill. She had no idea whether or
when her father-in-law and mother-in-law had ever learned the
extent of her wartime friendship with the American envoy, and
she was relieved by Lady Churchill's reaction38 relayed by young
Winston: "My, my, an old flame rekindled.,
Averell and Pamela were married shortly thereafter. In effect, she
brought him back from senility and death. Rejuvenated, he lived fifteen
happy years with her until his death at ninety-four.
Going back nearly a century, in Alaska in 1899 seven-year-old Averell
accompanied his family on an important journey of scientific exploration
run by his father. E.H. hired a boat for the expedition, engaging a
number of well-known figures to accompany the family on a vacation
trip. Included were John Burroughs, the naturalist, and John Muir, the
early conservationist. 39 Seventy years later, Averell, who had always
been reticent about his father, obviously troubled by his forbearer's infamous "robber baron" image, came across a tribute John Muir had written
about E.H. after that Alaska trip. Touched and delighted, Averell reproduced the forgotten tribute in a small booklet. Abramson writes:
For the rest of his life, he mailed them out, presented them to
visitors and took a supply with him whenever he traveled. He
no longer had to explain his father. Whenever the subject of
38. Id. at 685 (quoting Rudy Abramson, Interview with Pamela Harriman (undated)).
39. Id. at 67.
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E.H.'s railroad career came up thereafter, John Muir was
handy.'
These two events, the Alaska trip by a seven-year-old boy with his father and the resultant encomium passed around by the newly-proud
eighty-year-old son, form a lovely pair of bookends for this splendid biography which, like its subject, is strikingly successful in "spanning the
century."

40. Id. at 679 (noting that Muir's manuscript "said everything [Averell] had wanted to
believe about his father").

